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NOTES
PROOF OF ILLEGITIMACY IN PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS
The problem of proving that a child of a married woman, whose
husband is alive, but from whom she is separated, is illegitimate becomes a matter of great importance to the prosecuting attorney in any
paternity proceeding. However, some states have simplified the solution of this problem by legislation, while other states, of which Wisconsin is one, have, by a strict adherence to common law principles1 and
to certain statutory enactments, 2 made the solution of this problem
very difficult.
The obstacles which confront the prosecuting attorney in the latter
group of states is well illustrated in a Wisconsin decision.3 In this illegitimacy proceeding the husband and wife, having lived together up
to the year of 1879, separated. The wife did not see or have any relations with her husband after that date. However, there was no one
other than the husband or wife to prove this fact. In 1881, two years
after the separation, the wife gave birth to a child, the result of illicit
relations with a third person. The Wisconsin Supreme Court on an
appeal upheld the trial court's refusal to permit the husband or wife to
testify to the actual fact of their absolute separation and non-access.
Therefore, the prosecuting attorney could not possibly overcome the
prevailing common law presumption of legitimacy. As a result, this
illegitimate child was held to be legitimate.
The reasoning of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in this case was
based upon two well-known common law principles: first, that "A
child born of a married woman is presumed to be legitimate . . . but

this presumption may be wholly removed by proper and sufficient evidence showing that the husband was (1) incompetent, (2) entirely
absent so as to have no intercourse of any kind with the mother,
(3) entirely absent at the period during which the child must, in the
course of nature, have been begotten, or (4) only present under such
circumstances as afford clear and satisfactory proof that there was no
sexual intercourse ;-4 and second, that "Upon an issue as to the legitimacy of a child born in lawful wedlock neither the husband nor the
'Mink v. State, 60 Wis. 583, 19 N.W. 445 (1884) ; Shuman v. Shuman, 83 Wis.
250, 53 N.W. 455 (1892); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Flynn, 180 Wis. 556, 193
N.W. 651 (1923).
2 WIs. STAT. (1939) § 325.18.
3 Mink v. State, 60 Wis. 583, 19 N.W. 445 (1884).
4
Hargrave v. Hargrave, 9 Beav. 552, 50 Eng. Rep. 457 (1846); Shuman v.
Shuman, 83 Wis. 250, 53 N.W. 455 (1892); Scanlon v. Walshe, 81 Md. 118,
31 Atl. 498, 48 Am. St. Rep. 488 (1895).
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wife is a competent witness to testify as to the non-access of the husband,"5 "or to any fact even tending to prove or infer non-access.
Such non-access and illegitimacy must be proved by other testimony."
This second principle of law is commonly called the Lord Mansfield
Rule. It is the basic cause of the prevalent difficulties which face the
prosecutor in every illegitimacy action.
The historical background of the Lord Mansfield Rule deserves
mention in that it shows the peculiar way in which the rule has come
to be accepted as an established common law principle. In the early
part of the 18th century it was the settled rule of England, as found
in the case of Clerk v. Wright," that "a wife can testify as to the nonaccess of the husband in illegitimacy cases." But in the middle of that
century a rule limited to filiation cases was stated in Rex v. Reading,8
namely, that "a wife is incompetent to testify as to the non-access of
her husband unless such testimony is corroborated." Toward the end
of the century a chance judicial expression was made by Lord Mansfield in the case of Goodright v. Moss9 in which he stated, not as the
law of the case, but as dictum, that "the law of England is clear that
the declarations of a father or mother cannot be admitted to bastardize
the issue born after marriage .. .It is a rule founded in decency,
morality and policy that they shall not be permitted to say after marriage that they had no connection, and therefore the offspring is spurious, more especially the mother who is the offending party." These
words, commonly known as the Lord Mansfield Rule, have become
as effective as other men's positive decisions. Lord Mansfield depended
upon the rule of Rex v. Reading0 as authority for his statement, but
there is a wide contrast between his rule and the rule of that case. The
principle of Rex v. Reading applied only to filiation proceedings, had
application only to the wife, was flexible- according to the rule of disqualification by interest, and admitted the husband and wife's testimony as to non-access. It merely required corroboration in regard to
the wife's testimony. However, the Lord Mansfield Rule applies to all
issues of litigation, has application to both the husband and wife
equally, is based on a broad and fixed ground of policy, and excludes
5 State ex rel. Reynolds v. Flynn, 180 Wis. 556, 193 N.W. 651 (1923).
6Rex v. Sourton, 5 Adol. and El. 180, 111 Eng. Rep. 1134 (1836) ; Dennison v.
Page, 29 Pa. St. 420 (1857) ;People ex rel. Crandall v. Overseers of the Poor
of the Town of Ontario, 15 Barb. 286 (N.Y. 1853); Commonwealth v. Shepherd, 6 Binn. 283, 6 Am. Dec. 449 (Pa. 1814); State v. Pettaway, 3 Hawks
625, 10 N.C. 340 (1825); Cope v. Cope, 1 Moody and R. 269, 174 Eng. Rep.
92 (1833) ; Rex v. Luffe, 8 East 193, 103 Eng. Rep. 316 (1807) ; Mink v. State,
60 Wis. 583, 19 N.W. 445 (1884).
' 1 Bonr, POOR LAW (6th ed. 1717) 496.
8 Cas. temp. Hardwicke 79, 95 Eng. Rep. 49 (1734).

92 Cowper 591, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 11 E.R.C. 518 (1777).

10 Cas. temp. Hardwicke 79, 95 Eng. Rep. 49 (1734).

THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

absolutely the husband or wife's testimony as to non-access. A series
of decisions ignoring the settled rule as to the competency of a wife
to testify as to the non-access of her husband followed this Goodright
case. For example, in 1809 the case of Rex v. Kea" stated as law that
"the wife cannot testify as to the non-access of her husband." The
court cited as authority the case of Rex v. Reading'12 which was really
no authority at all. Such rulings opened the door for the establishment
and spread of the Lord Mansfield Rule.
The early American decisions 13 followed the principle of Rex v.
Reading, but about 1800 the American courts14 rejected this rule and
accepted with unquestioned faith the Lord Mansfield Rule.
Some of the states which adhere to the Lord Mansfield Rule are
as follows: Wisconsin,'2 Michigan,16 Iowa, 1 Illinois, 8 Arkansas, 19 and
New Hampshire. 20 Most of these states have even enacted statutes
which substantially set forth the role. The Wisconsin statute is typical
of such legislation.2 1
The reasons which these states give for following the Lord Mansfield Rule are most clearly expressed in the opinions of the courts of
Wisconsin, Arkansas, and New Hampshire: The Lord Mansfield Rule
prohibiting a husband or wife from testifying as to the non-access of
the husband in illegitimacy cases "is founded on the very highest
"111 East 132, 103 Eng. Rep. 954 (1809).
12 Cas. temp. Hardwicke 79, 95 Eng. Rep. 49 (1734).
'I Commonwealth v. Shepherd, 6 Binn. 283, 6 Am. Dec. 449 (Pa. 1814).
14 Barnett v. State, 16 Ark. 530 (1855); Kennedy v. State, 117 Ark. 113, 173
S.W. 842, L.R.A. 1916B, 1052, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 1029 (1915); State v. Reed,
107 W.Va. 563, 149 S.E. 669 (1929).
5
I Mink v.State, 60 Wis. 583, 19 N.W. 445 (1884) ; Shuman v. Shuman, 83 Wis.
250, 53 N.W. 455 (1892); State ex rel. Reynolds v.Flynn, 180 Wis. 556, 193
N.W.651 (1923); Wis. STAT. (1939) § 325.18.

MICH. Comp. LAWS (1929) c. 266, § 14221 ; Egbert v. Greenwalt, 44 Mich. 245,
6 N.W. 654 (1880) ; People v. Case, 171 Mich. 282, 137 N.W. 55 (1912) ; In re
Wright's Estate, 237 Mich. 375, 211 N.W. 746 (1927).
17 IowA CODE (1927) c. 494, H 11260, 11262; Wallace v. Wallace, 137 Iowa 37,
114 N.W. 527, 14 L.R.A. (N.s.) 544, 15 Am. Cas. 761, 126 Am.St. Rep. 253
(1908).
23,
isILL. Rxv. STAT. (1931) c. 51, § 5; People ex rel. Cullison v. Dile, 347 Ill.
179 N.E.93 (1931).
29 Kennedy v. State, 117 Ark. 113, 173 S.W.842, L.R.A. 1916B, 1052, Ann. Cas.
1917A, 1029 (1915); Liles v. State ex rel. Johnson, 117 Ark. 408, 174 S.W.
1196 (1915) ; Scott v. State, 173 Ark. 625, 292 S.W. 979 (1927).
20 Melvin v. Melvin, 58 N.H. 569, 42 Am. Rep. 605 (1879).
21 WIs. STAT. (1939) § 325.18 Husband and wife. "A husband or wife shall be
a competent witness for or against the other in all cases, except that neither
one without the consent of the other, during marriage, nor afterwards, shall
be permitted to disclose a private communication, made during the marriage,
by one to the other, when such private communication is privileged. Such private communication shall be privileged in all except the following cases:
(1) Where both husband and wife are parties to the action;
(2) Where such private communication relates to a charge of personal
violence by one upon the other;
(3) Where one has acted as the agent of the other and such private communication relates to matters within the scope of such agency."
16
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ground of public policy, decency, and morality."2 2 "The admission of
such testimony would be unseemly and scandalous, this not so much
from the fact that it reveals immoral conduct upon the part of the
parents as because of the effect it may have upon the child, who is in
no fault, but who must be the chief sufferer thereby."23 "That the parents should be permitted to illegitimatize the child is a proposition
24
which shocks our sense of right and decency."
Some of the states which dissent from the Lord Mansfield Rule are
as follows: New York, New Jersey, California, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina and Minnesota. Most of these states,
like the concurring states, have enacted statutes, but these statutes set
forth rules which show dissent from the Lord Mansfield Rule. In
New York the husband and wife are permitted to testify as to the nonaccess of the husband in illegitimacy cases by virtue of the following
statutory section: "If the mother is married both she and her husband
26
''
New Jersey has a similar statute.
may testify as to non-access."
Under this statute either spouse is competent to give testimony for or
2
against the other to prove adultery and thus illegitimatize the issue. T
2s
The California statute makes competent as witnesses all persons,
without exception, who can perceive and make known their perception
to others. Under this statute a wife may testify to non-access by her
husband after separation from him in any illegitimacy proceeding.29
In the state of Indiana a wife may testify as to the non-access of her
husband in illegitimacy proceedings as a result of statutory enactments
providing, first, that "a married woman is a competent witness in any
illegitimacy proceeding instituted by her," 30 second, that "in illegitimacy
proceedings the mother, if of sound mind, shall be a competent witness,"3 1 and third, that "the mother of an illegitimate child shall be a
competent witness to prove all the elements necessary to sustain the
charge, including the non-access of the husband."32 The Supreme Court
Mink v. State, 60 Wis. 583, 19 N.W. 445 (1884).
Kennedy v. State, 117 Ark. 113, 173 S.W. 842, L.R.A. 1916B, 1052, Ann. Cas.
1917A, 1029 (1915); Tioga County v. South Creek Township, 75 Pa. 433
(1847).
24 Melvin v. Melvin, 58 N.H. 569, 42 Am. Rep. 605 (1879).

22

23

§ 35g, as added by the Laws
1930, c. 434, § 1; Public Welfare Commissioner v. Zizzo, 260 N.Y. Supp. 169,
236 App. Div. 813 (1932).
26 N. J. 2 ComP. STAT. (1910). 2222, § 5.
27 Loudon v. Loudon, 114 NJ.Eq. 242, 168 At. 840, 89 A.L.R. 904 (1933).
28 CALIF. CODE OF CIvIL PROCEDURE (1919) §§ 1870, 1879.
29 In re McNamara's Estate, 181 Cal. 82, 183 Pac. 552, 7 A.L.R. 313 (1919).
30
IND. REV. STAT. (1881) §§ 978, 980; Evans v. State ex rel. Freeman, 165 Ind.
369, 74 N.E. 244 (1905).
31
BURNS ANN. IND. STAT. (1901) § 504, 990, 992; Cuppy v. State, 24 Ind. 389
(1865) ; Dean v. State, 29 Ind. 483 (1868).
32
BURNS ANN. IND. STAT. (1901) §§ 504, 990, 992; Evans v. State ex rel Freeman, 165 Ind. 369, 74 N.E. 244 (1905).
25

N. Y. INFFMOR CRIMINAL COURTS AcT (1932)
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of Kansas voiced the law of that state as follows: "The Lord Mansfield Rule is artificial and unsound, causing the suppression of truth and
the prevention of justice. Therefore we reject it and hold that a wife
is competent to testify as to the non-access of her husband in illegitimacy cases."33 Mississippi, dissenting from the Lord Mansfield Rule,
has enacted the following law: "The mother of the child is competent
to testify as to the non-access of the husband. '3 4 Montana has departed
from the Lord Mansfield Rule by the enactment of statutes providing
first, that "the presumption of legitimacy can be disputed only by the
husband or wife, or the descendant of one or both of them. Illegitimacy,
in such a case, may be proved like any other fact,"35 and second, that
"all persons, without exception, who can make known their perceptions
to others, may be witnesses."3 6 North Carolina has passed a similar
law.Y The operation of this decree is shown in an illegitimacy proceeding in which the wife was held to be a competent witness to show the
non-access of her husband.3 s Minnesota has also enacted statutes showing departure from and abrogation of the Lord Mansfield Rule. These
statutes state in substance first, that "any woman who is delivered of
an illegitimate child may institute the statutory filiation proceeding," 39
and second, that "every person of sufficient understanding, including
the parties to the action, whether married or not, are competent to
testify in any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before
40
any person who has authority to receive evidence."
The reasons which these states give for their dissent from the Lord
Mansfield Rule are most clearly summarized in the opinions of the
courts of Kansas and Mississippi: "The Lord Mansfield Rule is artificial and unsound and causes the suppression of truth and the prevention of justice." 41 Neither domestic nor social policy requires that the
husband or wife cannot testify as to non-access, and justice is not best
42
promoted by adhering to such a rule.1

The Mississippi court in the case of Moore v. Smith 4s sets forth the
reasons for its divergence from the Lord Mansfield Rule more completely, analyzing the specific arguments of the conflicting jurisdictions.
Lynch v. Rosenberger, 121 Kan. 601, 249 Pac. 682, 60 A.L.R. 376 (1926).
§§ 170, 179; Moore v. Smith, 178 Miss. 383, 173 So. 317
(1937).
35 MONT. REV. CODE (1921)
§ 5832; Parker v. Lew, 93 Mont. 525, 19 P. (2d)
1051 (1933).
36 MONT. REV. CODE (1921) § 10534.
37N. C. CODE (1888) § 588.
38 State v. McDonnell, 101 N.C. 734, 7 S.E. 785 (1888).
39 MASON'S MINN. STAT. (1927) § 3261; State v. Soyka, 181 Minn. 502, 233 N.W.
300 (1930).
40 MASON'S MINN. STAT. (1927) § 9814.
41 Lynch v. Rosenberger, 121 Kan. 601 249 Pac. 682, 60 A.L.R. 376 (1926).
42 Moore v. Smith, 178 Miss. 383, 172 So. 317 (1937).
43 Ibid.
33

4MIss. CODE (1930)
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It says that those states which concur with the Lord Mansfield Rule

claim that the rule "most wisely and properly protects the sanctity of
married relations and permits it not to be inquired into in any court
of law," 44 while those states which dissent from the rule claim first,
that it "protects an unfaithful wife, and also her paramour, both of
whom have grossly violated the matrimonial relation," 45 and second,
that it "closes the mouth of the injured husband and forces him to
remain tied to an unfaithful wife, and to acknowledge and support a
child which is not, in fact, his own."'46 Other common arguments enunciated by the court in favor of the Lord Mansfield Rule include these:
first, "it prevents disastrous consequences that would follow the unsetfling of titles to property," 47 second, "it lessens the number of public
charges,""4s and third, "it works for the peace and quiet of the family
and the community and society in general."4 9 The court then answers
these arguments in the following manner: first, "human rights-rights
that inhere in human beings as such-are of more value and should
be given preference over mere property rights,"50 second, "The fact
that the public may be called on to support an illegitimate child does
not justify the exclusion of evidence bearing on the legitimacy vel non
of the child, that is otherwise admissible and comes from the best
source," 51 and third, "Exactly how the peace of the community and
society generally would be protected by excluding this evidence is not
apparent. On the contrary, it would seem to be best protected by admitting any otherwise competent evidence that would relieve an innocent husband from remaining tied to an unfaithful wife, and being
charged with the care and support of a child of which he is not the
father."52
In the New Jersey case of Loudon v. Loudon5 3 the court reasoned
as follows in its rejection of the Lord Mansfield Rule: "The question is
now squarely before us. What should determine the view we should
adopt? The answer is obvious. We shall adopt that view in the case
at bar which we adopt in all our deliberations, namely, the one that
shall lead to a righteous judgment. Such a judgment must be founded
on truth, reason and justice. A rule of law which has existed in our
4 Ibid.

Poulette Peerage Case, A.C. 395 (1903) ; Moore v. Smith, 178 Miss. 383, 172
So. 317 (1937).
46 Moore v. Smith, 178 Miss. 383, 172 So. 317 (1937).
47 In re Wright's Estate, 237 Mich. 375, 211 N.W. 746 (1927); Moore v. Smith,
178 Miss. 383, 172 So. 317 (1937).
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Moore v. Smith, 178 Miss. 383, 172 So. 317 (1937).
51 Ibid.
45

52

53

Ibid.

Loudon v. Loudon, 114 N.J.Eq. 242, 168 AtI. 840, 89 A.L.R. 904 (1933).
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mother country for over 150 years and has been adopted and followed
in so many sister states would ordinarily strongly recommend itself
for our favorable consideration. But the fact that the rule is based on
a foundation that is unsound and leads to the suppression of the truth
and the defeat of justice takes from it the customary traditional and
precedential justification urging its adoption."
In the state of Wisconsin the Lord Mansfield Rule was criticized
by dissenting Justice Owen of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in these
words: "The reason underlying the rule prohibiting a married woman
from testifying to the non-access of her husband at or about the time of
conception for the purpose of illegitimatizing her child is somewhat
hazy. There seems to be an incongruity in permitting her to testify to
relations with a strange man, but prohibiting her from testifying to the
non-access of her husband." 4
However, the most famous attack on the Lord Mansfield Rule was
made by Wigmore. He criticizes the rule in the following manner: "We
learn, then, that the indecency or unseemliness lies in allowing a person to testify to an illicit connection, and that the immorality consists
in allowing a parent to give testimony which will ruin his own child's
legal status. The utterly artificial and false nature of the rule could not
more forcibly appear than in the inconsistency of these 'ex post facto'
reasons. (1) There is an indecency, we are told. And yet, in nine cases
out of ten, the sole question that the wife is asked is (for example)
whether her husband was in St. Louis from 1849 to 1853 during the
time that she was in New York. Is this indecent? Moreover, the very
next question may be whether during that time she lived with the
alleged adulterer; and this, (by general concession) is indubitably
allowable. In every sort of action whatever, a wife may testify to
adultery or a single woman to illicit intercourse; yet the one fact singled
out as 'indecent' is the fact of non-access on the part of a husband.
Such an inconsistency is obviously untenable. (2) There is an immorality and a scandal, we are told, in allowing married parents to illegitimatize their children. And yet they may lawfully commit this same immorality by any sort of testimony whatever, except to the fact of nonaccess. They may testify that there was no marriage ceremony, or that
the child was born before marriage, or that the one party was already
married to a third party, or their hearsay declarations (after death)
to illegitimacy in general may be used. In all these other ways they may
lawfully do the mean act of helping to bastardize their own children
born after marriage. Where is the consistency here? Of what value is
this conjuring phrase about 'bastardizing the issue,' if it will not do the
trick more than once in a dozen times? What shall be said of a system
54 State ex rel. Reynolds v. Flynn, 180 Wis. 556, 193 N.W. 651 (1923).
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of law which, while thus rebuking parents who come to prove their
children bastards, at the same time by its own inhuman prohibition
(unique among civilized peoples) has refused absolutely to allow those
parents, by any means whatever, to remove afterwards (by legitimation) the consequences of their original error and to give to their innocent children the sanction of lawful birth,-a refusal which is still
maintained in most of our jurisdictions? That the same law which
harshly fixed the stain of illegitimacy as perpetually indelible should
censure parents for the abomination of testifying to that illegitimacy
is preposterous.
The truth is that these high-sounding 'decencies' and 'moralities'
are mere pharisaical afterthoughts, invented to explain an otherwise
incomprehensible rule, and having no support in the established fact
and policies of our law. There never was any precedent for the rule;
and there is just as little reason of policy to maintain it." 55
LLOYD J. PLANERT.*

* Charles Nicoud, third year student, compiled part of the authority used in

this note. Acknowledgment is also due Nathan Heller, Assistant District
Attorney of Milwaukee County, for helpful advice on the problem.
55 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 2063, 2064; In re Wright's Estate, 237
Mich. 375, 211 N.W. 746 (1927); State v. Soyka, 181 Minn. 502, 233 N.W.

300 (1930).

